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THE  THEORY  OF 
MULTIPLE  EXPANSION  OF  DEPOSITS: 
WHAT  IT  IS AND  WHENCE  IT  CAME 
Thomas M.  Humphrey 
Beginning  students  of  banking  must  grapple  with  a  curious  paradox:  the  banking  system  can 
multiply  deposits  on  a  given  base  of  reserves  yet  none  of  its  member  banks  can  do  so.  Let  the 
reserve-to-deposit  ratio  be,  say,  20  percent  and  the  system  can,  by  making  loans,  create  $5  of 
deposit  money  per  dollar  of  reserves  received.  By  contrast,  the  individual  bank  receiving  that 
same  dollar  on  deposit  can  lend  out  no  more  than  80  cents  of  it.  How  does  one  reconcile  the 
banking  system's  ability  to  multiply  loans  and  deposits  with  the  individual  bank's  inability  to 
do  so?  Fully  answering  this  question  required  the  intellectual  efforts  of  at  least  six  economists 
writing  in  the  period  1826-1921.  The  story  of  their  contributions  is  the  story  of  the  evolution 
of  the  theory  of  the  multiple  expansion  of  deposits. 
At the  heart  of banking  theory  is the  notion  of the 
multiple  expansion  of bank  deposits.  This  idea  con- 
sists of two  interrelated  parts.  The  first explains  how 
the  banking  system  as a whole  creates  deposits  by 
making  loans  equal  to a multiple  of its cash  reserves, 
the  multiplier  being  the  inverse  of  the  reserve-to- 
deposit  ratio.  The  second  shows  how  the  individual 
bank  contributes  to this  expansion,  not  by multiply- 
ing its own  deposits,  but  rather  by making  loans  and 
losing  reserves  through  the  clearinghouse  to  other 
banks  so that  they  too  can  expand.  Taken  together, 
these  components  reconcile  the  banking  system’s 
ability  to  multiply  loans  and  deposits  with  the  in- 
dividual  bank’s  inability  to  do  so.  For  the  individual 
bank,  far from  expanding  its loans  by  several  times 
any  new  cash  deposits  received,  lends  out  only  the 
fraction  of  those  deposits  remaining  after  required 
reserves  have  been  set  aside. 
The  preceding  ideas  are  fairly  well  known.  Many 
economics  textbooks  explain  why  a banking  system 
having  a required  reserve  ratio  of,  say,  twenty  per- 
cent  can  create  five  dollars  of  deposit  money  per 
dollar  of cash  reserves  while  at the  same  time  no in- 
dividual  bank  can  lend  more  than  eighty  cents  per 
dollar  of  deposits  received.  What  the  texts  do  not 
explain,  however,  is the  origin  and  development  of 
the  theory.  The  result  is to  convey  the  impression 
that  the  theory  has always existed  in its present  form, 
having  been  fully  and  correctly  articulated  from  the 
start.  Nothing,  however,  could  be  further  from  the 
truth.  On  the  contrary,  as Lloyd  Mints  notes  in his 
authoritative  A History of Banking Theory (1945),  “The 
problem  of the  manner  in which  the  banking  system 
increases  the  total  volume  of the  circulating  medium, 
while  at the  same  time  the  lending  power  of the  in- 
dividual  banks  is severely  limited,  has  proved  to  be 
one  of the  most  baffling for writers  on banking  theory” 
[10,  p.  39].  Far  from  understanding  how  loans 
generate  deposits,  bankers  throughout  the  nineteenth 
and early  twentieth  centuries  insisted  that  banks  lend 
only  the  funds  entrusted  to  their  care  and  therefore 
could  not  possibly  multiply  deposits.  Economists,  on 
the  other  hand,  often  went  to the  opposite  extreme, 
arguing  that  individual  banks  were  simply  small-scale 
versions  of the banking  system  at large and thus  could 
multiply  deposits  per  dollar  of  reserves  just  as  the 
system  does.  Both  views  were  wrong.  Not  until  the 
1820s  did a more  plausible  view start to emerge.  And 
not  until  the  1920s  was it finally  stated  in a way that 
fully  convinced  the  economics  profession  and  thus 
enabled  the  theory  to  gain  widespread  acceptance. 
In  an  attempt  to  provide  historical  perspective  and 
to  show  how  earlier  writers  resolved  the  paradox  of 
a banking  system  doing  what  none  of  its  members 
could  do, this article traces  the  evolution  of the  theory 
between  those  two  dates.  Before  doing  so, however, 
it reviews  the  essentials  of the  theory  as a prerequisite 
to  identifying  what  earlier  writers  had  to  say  about 
them. 
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Suppose  for simplicity  that the  banking  system  con- 
sists  of a single  monopoly  bank  constrained  by  a re- 
quired  reserve-to-deposit  ratio  r and  desiring  to  be 
fully loaned  up.  Suppose  further  that  the  public  never 
wishes  to  convert  deposits  into  currency  so that  no 
cash  withdrawals  occur  when  deposits  expand. 
Because  the  bank  cannot  lose  reserves  through  the 
clearinghouse  to  other  banks  (of  which  there  are 
none)  or  to  cashholders  via  withdrawal,  it faces  no 
restriction  on its ability  to expand  loans  and  deposits 
other  than  the  requirement  that  it hold  r percent  of 
its deposits  in reserves.  Thus  upon  the  receipt  of C 
dollars  of new  reserves  it can  instantly  expand  loans 
and  deposits  D  up  to  the  full  limit  allowed  by  the 
reserve  ratio-that  is, up to the  amount  D  =  (1/r)C, 
where  (1/r),  the  inverse  of  the  reserve  ratio,  is the 
deposit  expansion  multiplier.  In this  way  the  system 
as a whole  multiplies  deposits  per  dollar  of reserves. 
Next  suppose  that  the  system  consists  of  many 
small  banks,  each  of which  loses  through  the  clear- 
inghouse  reserves  equal  to  the  full  amount  of loans 
made.  Because  of  these  adverse  clearing  balances, 
no bank  can  safely  lend  out  more  than  (1 - r) of each 
dollar of deposits  received,  this sum being  the  amount 
remaining  after  r percent  has  been  put  in  required 
reserve.  Thus  the  first  individual  bank  receiving  C 
dollars  of  new  cash  deposits  lends  (1 -  r)C  of  that 
amount  after putting  rC dollars  in reserve.  When  bor- 
rowers  write  checks  on  the  proceeds  of the  loans  in 
favor  of  recipients  who  deposit  the  checks  in  a 
second  group  of banks,  the  latter  banks  gain (1 -  r)C 
dollars  in new  deposits.  They  in turn  keep  r percent 
of the  new  deposits  in reserve  and  lend  out  the  re- 
maining  (1 -  r)  percent  so  that  their  loans  equal 
(1 -r)(1  -r)C.  This  amount  they  lose  through  the 
clearinghouse  to  a  third  group  of  banks  whose 
deposits  accordingly  rise by  (1 -  r)2C, and who,  after 
setting  aside  a fraction  r for reserve,  lend  out  the  re- 
maining  (1 -r)3C.  And  so it goes  from  bank  to  bank 
in ever-diminishing  amounts  until  excess  reserves  are 
zero  and  all the  new  cash  reserves  C  are  absorbed 
in backing  deposits  in the  ratio  of  1 to  r.  Summing 
over  the  successive  groups  of  banks  in  the  dwin- 
dling,  never-ending  chain  gives  total  new  deposits 
D  for  the  system  of  D  =  [1  +  (1 -  r)  +  (1 -r)2  + 
(1-r)3  +  . . .  +  (1 -r)n]C  which,  when  the 
number  of banks  n gets  large,  converges  to the  limit 
D  =  (1/r)C,  the  same  expression  that  holds  for  the 
single  monopoly  bank. 
In  short,  multiple  expansion  occurs  in  the 
multibank  case  because  the  excess  reserves  that  form 
the  basis for loans,  though  lost to the  individual  bank, 
are not  lost to the  system  as a whole.  They  are simply 
transferred  to  other  banks  that  use  them  for  further 
expansion.  As the  expansion  proceeds  from  bank  to 
bank,  each  institution  retains  the  reserves  required 
to  back  the  new  deposits  that  brought  it  the  extra 
reserves  in the  first place  and lends  out the remainder. 
The  result  is multiple  expansion,  the  same  as that 
achieved  in the  monopoly  case.  The  only  difference 
is that  in  the  multibank  case  each  individual  bank 
does  not  multiply  its own  deposits.  Rather  it creates 
them  for  other  banks  by  making  loans  and  allowing 
its reserves  to shrink  to a fraction  of the  initial deposit. 
In a word,  the  banking  system  collectively  multiplies 
deposits  per  dollar  of  new  reserves  while  the  small 
individual  bank  fractionalizes  reserves  per  dollar  of 
new  deposits. 
Historical  Evolution 
Having  outlined  the  theory  itself,  we  are  now 
prepared  to  trace  its  origin  and  development. 
Retrospectively,  one  can  discern  a  certain  logical 
progression.  First  came  the  perception  that  deposits 
are  a multiple  of  reserves,  followed  by  a rudimen- 
tary  exposition  of  the  lending,  redeposit,  and 
multiplier  aspects  of the  expansion  mechanism.  Next 
appeared  a specification  of the  limits  to  deposit  ex- 
pansion  and  a  definition  of  the  limit  value  of  the 
multiplier.  There  followed  an analysis  of how  expan- 
sion  spreads  from  bank  to  bank  in  a  multibank 
system.  Then  came  the  first  algebraic  statement  of 
the  theory  followed  by  the  first  clear  distinction  be- 
tween  the  expansion  power  of a monopoly  bank  and 
a  competitive  bank.  Finally  came  the  persuasive 
restatement  of  the  theory  that,  by  consolidating, 
refining,  and  elaborating  its  key  ideas,  estab- 
lished  it in mainstream  banking  analysis.  Each  stage 
saw  a  different  innovator-Pennington,  Torrens, 
Joplin,  Marshall,  Davenport,  and Phillips  are the  key 
names  here-advance  the  theory. 
Multiple  Deposits  Recognized 
The  initial  step  in the  theory’s  evolution  came  in 
the  eighteenth  century  when  writers  such  as John 
Law  (1671-1729),  Bishop  Berkeley  (1685-1753),  and 
Alexander  Hamilton  (1755-1804)  observed  that  bank 
deposits  were  several  times  larger  than  the  under- 
lying  cash  base  and  inferred  from  this  that  banks 
create  deposits  (see  O’Brien  [11,  p.  15]).  These 
writers,  however,  did not  explain  the  mechanism  that 
works  to  multiply  deposits.  They  simply  assumed 
that  multiple  deposit  expansion  would  somehow 
occur  for  both  the  individual  bank  and  the  banking 
system  as a whole.  They  failed  to  state  that  deposit 
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and redeposit  of excess  reserves.  Not  until  1826 was 
this  point  made  clear. 
James  Pennington  (1777-1862) 
It  was  James  Pennington,  a  British  currency  ex- 
pert  and confidential  monetary  advisor  to the  govern- 
ment,  who  advanced  the  theory  into  its second  stage. 
He  did  so  with  his  rudimentary  exposition  of  the 
lending,  redeposit,  and  multiplier  mechanics  of 
deposit  expansion.  His  contribution  appears  in  his 
1826  memorandum  to  the  English  statesman  and 
financier  William Huskisson.  There  he shows  (1) that 
with fractional  reserve  banking  cash deposits  produce 
excess  reserves,  (2)  that  such  excess  reserves  lead 
to loans,  and  (3) that  the  proceeds  of the  loans  when 
redeposited  in  the  system  augment  the  volume  of 
deposits  per  dollar  of cash  base.  To  illustrate  these 
points  he  argued  that  if banks  receive  a cash  deposit 
of  which  half  must  be  held  in  reserve  the  rest  will 
go to purchase  earning  assets  (loans and investments). 
The  sellers  of these  assets  will,  upon  receiving  the 
cash,  redeposit  it in their  banks  thus  increasing  the 
volume  of deposits.  At the  end  of this  first  round  of 
the  expansion  process,  the  cash reserves  of the  banks 
will  be  the  same  as  before,  but  the  sum  total  of 
deposits-including  the  initial  cash  deposit  plus  the 
additional  deposits  created  by  loan-will  already  be 
increased  by  fifty  percent.  In  his  words: 
of  the  money  entrusted  to  their  [bankers’]  care.  . . .if  a 
reserve  of one  half were  sufficient.  . . the  other  half would 
be  employed  in  discounting  bills  [i.e.,  making 
loans].  . . . But  the  Persons  to  whom  these  ad- 
vances  . . . were  made,  would,  for their  own  convenience, 
deposit  the  money.  .  .  in  the  hands  of  their  respective 
bankers,  and  the  aggregate  amount  of  the  outstanding 
[deposit]  balances.  . . would.  . . be  encreased  50  per 
cent.  . . .The  money  due  to  all the  depositors  would  be 
50 per  cent  more  than  it was previously  to the  commence- 
ment  of  these  operations.  . . [12,  pp.  xlv-xlvi]. 
Pennington  did  not  trace  the  expansion  process 
beyond  the  first  round.  But  he  did  indicate  how  the 
individual  bank  contributes  to  expansion  in  a 
multibank  system.  He  pointed  out  that  as one  bank 
expands  its loans  it either  recovers  the  proceeds  in 
the  form  of redeposits  or else it loses reserves  to other 
banks  so  that  they  too  can  expand.  Either  way, 
deposits  increase.  As he  put  it in a letter  published 
in  Volume  2  of  Thomas  Tooke’s  History  of  Prices 
(1838),  if, after  a bank  receives  an initial cash deposit 
and  makes  a  loan, 
a cheque  be  drawn  upon  the.  . . banker  for  the  amount 
of the  advance.  . . . [and] be  paid  into  his  hands  by  some 
other  depositor,  and  placed  at  the  credit  of  that  other 
depositor.  . . the  whole  amount  of the  book  credits  [i.e., 
deposits]  of  that  banker  will  be  increased  to  the  extent 
of this  new  advance.  And  even  if the  cheque  be  paid  into 
the  hands  of  some  other  banker,  the  [initial]  amount  of 
the  book  credits  of the  banker  who  has  paid  the  cheque 
will  not  be  diminished,  while  the  book  credits,  as  well 
as  the  reserved  fund  of  the  banker,  to  whom  it  is paid, 
will  be  increased  by  its  amount  [13,  p.  lvi]. 
In  other  words,  reserves  lost  by  one  bank  show  up 
as  new  deposits  in  another.  In  this  way  deposits 
gradually  multiply  on the given  increase  in the reserve 
base  as it shifts  from  bank  to bank.  To  illustrate,  he 
showed  that  if the  first bank  in a system  of two iden- 
tical banks  lends  and loses  through  the  clearinghouse 
half its initial  cash  reserve  to  the  second  that  subse- 
quently  does  the  same,  deposits  of both  banks  ex- 
pand  although  the  reserve  base  remains  unchanged 
[12,  pp.  xlvii-xlviii]. 
Pennington’s  failure  to trace  the  expansion  process 
to  its  completion  accounts  for  his  failure  to  specify 
the  limit  value  of  the  multiplier.  Far  from  defining 
it  as  the  reciprocal  of  the  reserve  ratio,  he  was 
content  merely  to  demonstrate  that  its  value  was 
greater  than  one.  He  also denied  that  he viewed  the 
multiplier  as  a  rigid  mechanical  relationship.  This 
view  was attributed  to him  by Robert  Torrens,  who 
cited  Pennington  as  the  source  of  the  notion  that 
London  banks  always  hold  in  the  form  of  notes  of 
the  Bank  of England  a one-fifth  cash  reserve  against 
deposits,  resulting  in  a  multiplier  of  five.  In 
correcting  Torren’s  misapprehension,  Pennington 
said: 
It  never  occurred  to  me,  as  appears  to  have  been  sup- 
posed  by  Colonel  Torrens,  that  every  million  of  notes 
issued  by  the  Bank  of  England  forms  the  basis  of  five 
millions  of deposits;  and that  every  million withdrawn  from 
circulation,  by the  Bank,  occasions  a five-fold  diminution 
of those  deposits.  On  the  contrary,  it is perfectly  consis- 
tent  with  my  view  of  the  subject,  to  suppose  that  the 
deposit  accounts  of the  London  bankers  may  be materially 
diminished,  while  the  circulation  of the  Bank  of England 
is  greatly  enlarged,  or  vice  versa  [13,  p.  lii]. 
Pennington  contended  that  bankers’  desired  reserve 
ratios  (and  thus  the  multiple  relationship  between 
deposits  and reserves)  vary  with  the  state  of business 
confidence.  In  so  doing,  he  originated  the  notion 
of  a flexible  multiplier. 
Pennington’s  contemporaries  quickly  grasped  the 
significance  of his pioneering  work.  Torrens  referred 
to it as “a subject  of the  greatest  practical  importance” 
[19, p.  12]. The  Banking  School  likewise  shared  this 
opinion.  While  not  accepting  his definition  of deposits 
as money,  they  used  his notion  of a flexible  multiplier 
to  argue  that  the  credit  superstructure  (of  which 
deposits  were  the  chief  component)  could  expand 
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base  such  that  control  of the  base  did not  imply  con- 
trol  of  the  superstructure. 
Robert  Torrens  (1780-1864) 
Pennington  was  the  first  to  outline  the  lending, 
redeposit,  and multiplier  aspects  of bank  credit  crea- 
tion.  But Robert  Torrens  was the  first  to specify  the 
limits  to deposit  expansion  and to define  the  limiting 
value of the  multiplier.  Torrens,  a professional  soldier, 
newspaper  proprietor,  member  of  Parliament,  pro- 
moter  of  schemes  for  the  colonization  of  Australia, 
co-discoverer  of the  theory  of comparative  advantage, 
and one  of the  ablest  monetary  theorists  of his genera- 
tion,  presented  his analysis  in his  1837 Letter to Lord 
Melbourne.  There,  in  a section  bearing  the  caption 
“A given  amount  of  circulating  Cash  becomes  the 
basis  of a much  greater  amount  of Bank  Deposits,” 
he  wrote  that  deposits  expand  until  they  reach  that 
particular  ratio  to  reserves  that  bankers  deem  “safe 
and  legitimate”  [19,  p.  16].  In  other  words,  the 
desired  deposit/reserve  ratio  together  with  the 
available  quantity  of  reserves  fixes  the  upper  limit 
to  expansion.  He  also  explained  how  deposits  grow 
up to this  limit.  Stressing  the  successive  lending  and 
redeposit  of  excess  reserves,  he  wrote  that  given 
a reserve.  . .in  coin.  . . more  than  sufficient  to  meet.  . . 
occasional  demands.  . . . a part  of this  coin  would  be  again 
advanced  upon  securities,  and  would  be  again  returned 
upon  the  banks,  in  the  form  of  new  deposits,  restoring 
their  reserve.  . .to  the  original  sum.  . .[19,  p.  15]. 
It  follows  that 
Whatever  sums  they  may  advance  upon  securities  in the 
morning,  the  same  sums  will be  returned  to  them  in the 
evening,  in the  form  of new  deposits;  and  in this  way  the 
amount  of their  deposits  must  continue  to increase,  until 
they  bear  that  proportion  to  the  fixed  amount  of  the 
returning  cash,  which  the  experience  of the  bankers  may 
suggest  as  safe  and  legitimate  [19,  p.  16]. 
That  is,  expansion  proceeds  via  the  successive 
lending  and  redeposit  of  excess  cash  reserves  until 
the  desired  deposit/reserve  ratio  is  attained. 
As  for  the  deposit  multiplier  itself,  Torrens  ex- 
pressed  it as the  inverse  of the  reserve  ratio.  He  saw, 
for  example,  that  a reserve  ratio  of one-tenth  would 
produce  a  multiplier  of  ten.  Observing  that 
in  ordinary  times,  one-tenth,  or  even  one-twentieth,  of 
the  money  deposited  with  a banker,  is  a  sufficient  rest 
[reserve]  for  meeting  occasional  demands;  and  that  nine- 
tenths,  or  even  nineteenth-twentieths,  of  the  sums 
deposited  with  a bank  may  be  lent  out  on  securities  [19, 
p.  18], 
he  concluded: 
I  should  not  be  arguing  on  an  extreme  case,  were  I  to 
assume  that  the  cash  originally  deposited.  . . with  bankers, 
will  be  successively  re-issued  upon  securities,  by  the 
banks,  and  successively  returned  to  them,  in the  form  of 
new  deposits,  until  the  proportion  between  the  amount 
of the  deposits,  and  the  amount of  the  cash,  is as ten  to 
one  [19,  pp.  18-19]. 
Here  is the  first  clear  statement  of the  multiplier  as 
the  reciprocal  of  the  reserve  ratio. 
In  his  theoretical  analysis,  Torrens  treated  the 
multiplier  as a potentially  variable  magnitude,  fluc- 
tuating  in value  from  a high  of  twenty  to  a low  of 
five  depending  on  the  state  of  business  confidence 
and  its  impact  on  bankers’  desired  deposit/reserve 
ratios.  As  he  put  it,  these  ratios 
will necessarily  vary with  the  variations  of commercial  con- 
fidence.  When  trade  is prosperous,  when  few  failures  are 
occurring,  and  when  commercial  bills  are  promptly  paid 
as  they  fall  due,  bankers  might  consider  it  safe  to  con- 
tinue  to re-issue,  upon  securities,  the  cash  returning  upon 
them  as  deposits,  until  the  proportion  between  their 
deposits  and  their  cash,  became  as fifteen  to one,  or even 
as twenty  to  one.  In periods  of commercial  pressure,  on 
the  other  hand,  bankers  would  be  disposed  to  contract 
their  liabilities,  until  the  deposits.  . . bore  to  their  cash  a 
proportion,  not  exceeding  seven  to  one,  or  even  five  to 
one  [19,  pp.  17-18]. 
Owing  to  these  potential  multiplier  fluctuations,  “a 
fixed  amount  of circulating  money  may  be  the  basis 
of a fluctuating  amount  of credit  money”  [19,  p.  17]. 
Yet  in  his  practical  policy  analysis  he  treated  the 
multiplier  (or deposit/reserve  ratio)  as a more-or-less- 
fixed  constant,  arguing that  control  of the  reserve  base 
constituted  automatic  control  of the  deposit  super- 
structure. 
This  last  idea  proved  especially  influential.  The 
Currency  School  used  it to  argue  that  bank  reserves 
controlled  an inverted  credit  pyramid  (with  deposits 
the  chief  component)  resting  on a gold  and banknote 
base.  Through  the  writings  of the  Currency  School, 
Torrens’s  doctrines  of  deposit  multiplication  on  a 
reserve  base  and deposit  control  via that  base  became 
sufficiently  well  established  by  the  mid-nineteenth 
century  to  be  bequeathed  to  future  generations  of 
monetarists  (see  O’Brien  [11,  p.  16]).  In  short,  the 
modern  monetarist  notion  of  base  control  derives 
straight  from  Torrens  by way of the  Currency  School. 
Thomas  Joplin  (1790-1847) 
The  next  step  in the  theory’s  evolution  was taken 
by Thomas  Joplin,  a British  banker  and co-originator 
of  the  principle  of  “metallic  fluctuation”  around 
which  much  of nineteenth  century  monetary  contro- 
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from  Torrens’s  of  the  way  deposits  expand  to  the 
limit  set  by  bankers’  desired  reserve  ratios.  As 
documented  above,  Torrens  focused  on the  lending- 
redeposit  mechanism  of  the  banking  system  as  a 
whole;  he  did  not  trace  the  expansion  process  from 
bank  to bank.  He  merely  stated  that banks  as a group 
expand  loans,  then  recoup  the  proceeds  in the  form 
of redeposits,  and  then  expand  again and  again until 
the  limit  is reached.  He  did  not  identify  individual 
banks  nor  did he mention  the  distribution  of reserves 
among  them. 
By contrast,  Joplin  explained  how  expansion  pro- 
ceeds  from  one  bank  to  the  next,  each  lending  out 
its  excess  reserve  and  losing  it  to  another  bank 
which  also  expands  and  so on  until  excess  reserves 
are  eliminated  and  all cash  is  absorbed  in  backing 
deposits  at  the  ratio  desired  by  bankers.  Joplin 
developed  his  analysis  in  his  1841  book The Cause 
and  Cure of Our  Commercial  Embarrassments.  He  starts 
out  by establishing  the  limits  to expansion  and defin- 
ing the  deposit  multiplier  as the  inverse  of the  reserve 
ratio. 
Every  banker.  . . has  therefore  the  power  of creating  bank 
money,  and.  . . there  is no  other  limit  to  the  exercise  of 
this  power  than  his  own  prudence.  . . . I apprehend  that 
bank  money  is always  created  by  the  bankers  to  the  full 
extent  that  prudence  will  permit.  If  one-fifth  of  their 
deposits  in cash  be  sufficient  to meet  any demand  for pay- 
ment  by  their  depositors,  for  every  thousand  pounds  of 
cash  deposited  with  them,  they  discount  to  the  extent 
of £5,000,  and  create  £5,000  of bank  money  (7, pp.  33, 
as  quoted  in  Mints  10,  p.  105]. 
He  then  proceeds  to  trace  the  expansion  process 
across  a  succession  of  banks  until  the  limit  is 
reached.  Assuming  a reserve  ratio  of 20 percent,  he 
states  that  a bank  receiving  a  new  cash  deposit  of 
£1,000  will  immediately  put  £200  in  reserves  and 
lend  out  the  remaining  £800.  The  borrowers,  upon 
receiving  this  sum, 
pay  the  amount,  we  shall  assume,  to  the  credit  of  their 
account  with  some  other  banker,  who.  . . finds  his  cash 
increased  £800,  and  his deposits  £800,  and  he has  in con- 
sequence  £640  to spare,  which  he lends  accordingly.  This 
again  being  paid  into  another  bank,  the  same  operation, 
again  occurs,  and  so  it goes  on  from  bank  to  bank  until 
the  thousand  pounds  has  created  for itself  deposits  to the 
extent  of  £5,000  [7,  pp.  33-34,  as  quoted  in  Mints  10, 
p.  105]. 
Here  are all the  elements  found  in modern  textbook 
treatments  of the  multiple  expansion  process:  (1) the 
initial  cash  deposit  that  generates  excess  reserves, 
(2)  the  lending  out  and  subsequent  loss  of  those 
reserves  to other  banks  who  repeat  the  process,  (3) 
the  resulting  diminution  of  excess  reserves  at  each 
successive  bank  as they  are absorbed  in backing  the 
extra  deposits  created  by  their  arrival,  and  (4)  the 
cumulative  rise in deposits  until  they  reach  their  limit 
ratio  to cash  reserves,  at which  point  excess  reserves 
vanish.  All that  was missing was a mathematical  state- 
ment  of  the  process. 
Alfred  Marshall  (1842-1924) 
The  mathematical  statement  referred  to above  con- 
stituted  the  next  stage  of the  theory.  The  key  name 
here  is  that  of  the  great  English  neoclassical 
economist  Alfred  Marshall,  who  provided  the 
algebraic  basis  for  the  theory  and  who  used  the 
standard  mathematical  technique  to  derive  the 
deposit  expansion  multiplier  as the  summation  of a 
geometrical  series.  Marshall  used  the  symbol  n  to 
denote  the  multiplier,  defined  by  him  as the  ratio  of 
deposits  to  reserves  (i.e.,  the  inverse  of the  reserve 
ratio).  In  a  note  scribbled  in  the  margin  of  his 
personal  copy  of  Robert  Giffen’s  Stock Exchange 
Securities (1877),  he  wrote: 
Let  it  [bankers’  desired  reserve/deposit  ratio]  be  1/n  th: 
Let  A be  the  original  amount  of deposits  without  credit: 
as  well  as  if many,  except  that  if there  are  many  banks 
n cannot  be very  large in any one  bank,  while  on the  other 
hand  if the  banks  pool  their  reserves  (theoretically  or prac- 
tically)  they  count  as cash  what  they  have  in the  pool  and 
the  pool  lends  much  of  that  again  [quoted  in  Eshag  4, 
pp.  9-101. 
He  elaborates  the  substance  of this  brief  note  in his 
evidence  before  the  Gold  and  Silver  Commission  of 
1887.  He  says: 
I should  consider  what  part  of  its  deposits  a bank  could 
lend  and  then  I  should  consider  what  part  of  its  loans 
would  be  redeposited  with  it and  with  other  banks  and, 
vice  versa,  what  part  of  the  loans  made  by  other  banks 
would  be  received  by  it  as  deposits.  Thus  I should  get 
a geometrical  progression;  the  effect  being  that  if each 
bank  could  lend  two-thirds  of its deposits,  the  total amount 
of loaning  power  got  by the  banks  would  amount  to three 
times  what  it  otherwise  would  be.  If it  could  lend  four- 
fifths,  it will then  be  five  times;  and  so on.  The  question 
how  large  a part  of its  deposits  a bank  can  lend  depends 
in  a great  measure  on  the  extent  to  which  the  different 
banks  directly  or indirectly  pool  their  resources  [8, p.  37, 
as  quoted  in  Eshag  4,  p.  10]. 
In  these  passages  Marshall  makes  three  main 
points.  First,  to find  the  multiplier,  one  simply  adds 
to  each  dollar  of  initial  cash  deposit  the  proportion 
of that  dollar that  successive  banks  can lend  as it goes 
in dwindling  amounts  from  bank  to bank.  In this con- 
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etc.,  of  Marshall’s  equation  are  the  same 
as the  terms  (1 -r),  (1 -r)2,  etc.,  which  show the pro- 
portion  of each  dollar of initial deposit  that  successive 
banks  can  lend  out  after  required  reserves  have  been 
set  aside.  The  resulting  multiplier,  Marshall  notes, 
is  the  same  whether  the  system  is  composed  of  a 
single  monopoly  bank  or  many  small  competing 
banks.  Second,  the  proportion  of its deposits  a bank 
can  lend  is determined  by  its  reserve  ratio.  If  that 
ratio  is,  say,  one-fifth,  the  bank  can  lend  out  the 
remaining  four-fifths  of  its  deposits.  Third,  reserve 
ratios  and  the  resulting  power  to  lend  vary  by  type 
of bank.  Small isolated  banks,  because  of their  poten- 
tially  greater  exposure  to  cash  drains  and  adverse 
clearings,  will operate  with  larger  reserve  ratios  than 
big  banks  or  those  having  ready  access  to  a central 
reserve  pool. 
Herbert  Joseph  Davenport  (1861-1931) 
The  theory  progressed  to its sixth  stage  with  Uni- 
versity  of  Missouri  economist  H.  J.  Davenport’s 
distinction  between  the  expansion  power  of a single 
monopoly  bank  versus  that  of  a  small  competitive 
bank  in  a  multibank  system.  “Modern  develop- 
ments,”  writes  F.  A.  Hayek,  “follow  the  exposition 
of H.  J. Davenport”  [6, p.  153].  On  page  261  of his 
Economics  of Enterprise (1913)  Davenport  shows  that 
a monopoly  bank  in a closed  community  can do what 
a  whole  banking  system  can  do  but  what  a  com- 
petitive  bank  cannot  do,  namely  multiply  loans  and 
deposits  per  dollar  of  cash  reserves  received.  The 
monopoly  bank,  he  says,  loses  no  reserves  to  other 
banks;  all checks  written  on  it return  in the  form  of 
redeposits.  Consequently  the  only  restriction  on  its 
ability  to  expand  is  that  it  keep  r  percent  of  cash 
reserves  against  deposits.  Thus  upon  the  receipt  of 
C  dollars  of new  reserves  it can  expand  deposits  D 
up  to  the  limit  D = (1/r)C. 
To  illustrate,  he  shows  that  a new  monopoly  bank, 
being  the  only  bank  in an  isolated  town  and  facing 
a reserve  requirement  of  1.5  percent,  will, upon  open- 
ing  for  business,  engineer  a  6 2/3-fold expansion  of 
loans  and  deposits  per  dollar  of initial  cash  reserves 
contributed  by the  stockholders.  He  then  applies  this 
same  multiplier  to a cash  deposit  of $100,000,  show- 
ing how  the  bank  puts  $15,000  in reserve,  lends  out 
an amount  equal  to  six and two-thirds  of the  remain- 
ing  $85,000,  and  realizes  a  deposit  expansion 
(primary  plus  loan-derived)  of  $666,666.  The 
monopoly  bank,  he  explains,  expands  up to the  limit 
allowed  by  the  reserve  ratio  for  one  reason:  it loses 
no reserves  through  the clearinghouse  or through  cash 
drain. 
For  the.  . . customers  of the  bank  make  payments  through 
checks  upon  the  bank,  and  these  credits  are  deposited 
in turn  to the  credit  of other  customers.  . . . And  if some 
customers  draw  out  cash,  other  customers  will 
probably  receive  it and  return  it to  the  bank  [3, p.  261]. 
Having  described  the  multiplicative  power  of  a 
monopoly  bank,  he  turns  his  attention  to  the  com- 
petitive  bank.  He  notes  that  a competitive  bank  can- 
not  expand  to  the  extent  of a monopoly  bank  since 
its  attempts  to  do  so  will  result  in  reserve  losses 
through  the  clearinghouse.  The  competitive  bank, 
he  says,  cannot  expect  the  proceeds  of  its  loans  to 
be  redeposited  with  it.  On  the  contrary, 
When  the  check  drawn  by  the  borrowing  depositor  may 
be  deposited  in other  banks  and  collected  by them  against 
the  lending  bank,  its granting  of credits  rapidly  draws  down 
its  reserves  to  swell  the  reserves  of  its  competitors  [3, 
p.  263]. 
These  reserves,  he  notes,  go to  other  banks,  which 
also try  to expand;  in this  way the  system  as a whole 
ultimately  expands  in the  same  ratio  as the  monopoly 
bank.  He  also  suggests  that  when  all  banks 
simultaneously  expand  their  loans  approximately  in 
balance,  their  reserve  losses  will tend  to cancel  each 
other. 
Each  bank,  as it,  in turn  lends  to  its  customers,  is losing 
reserves  to  other  banks,  but  is,  in turn,  gaining  reserves 
at  the  expense  of  the  other  banks-if  at  the  same  time 
the  banking  activity  of  these  other  banks  is maintained 
[3,  p.  287]. 
To  the  extent  this  happens,  the  group  of  banks 
together  can  (like  a monopoly  bank)  quickly  expand 
to  the  limit  allowed  by  the  reserve  ratio. 
Chester  Arthur  Phillips  (1882-1976) 
The  theory  of deposit  expansion  reached  its zenith 
with  the  publication  of C.A.  Phillips’s Bank Credit  in 
1921.  There  in the  famous  Chapter  III entitled  “The 
Philosophy  of Bank Credit”  he stated  the  theory  with 
a power,  precision,  and  completeness  unmatched  by 
his predecessors.  In particular,  it was  Phillips  more 
than  anyone  else  who  brought  home  to  the  eco- 
nomics  profession  the  crucial  distinction  between  the 
reserve  loss  of a competitive  bank  that  expands  its 
loans  versus  multiple  expansion  by  the  banking 
system  as  a  whole.  In  so  doing,  he  advanced  the 
theory  in  at  least  three  ways. 
First,  he  refuted  the  view,  held  by  Horace  White, 
H.  D.  McLeod,  and  other  banking  writers  of  the 
time,  that  an individual  bank  multiplies  its deposits 
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does.  Not  so,  said  Phillips.  An  individual  bank  can 
not  multiply  deposits.  For  its  attempts  to  do  so  by 
making  loans  of  several  times  the  amount  of  new 
reserves  received  will simply  result  in reserve  losses 
to  other  banks  equal  to  the  amount  of  the  loans 
made  (or slightly  less  if a small  fraction  of the  loans 
returns  to  the  bank  as deposits).  No  bank,  he  said, 
could  tolerate  such  losses  that  imperiled  its  legal 
reserve  position. 
Let  us  suppose  that  the  Hanover  National  Bank  of New 
York  acquires  a deposit  of $1,000,000  in gold  imported 
and  lends  $10,000,000  to its  customers,  an amount  sug- 
gested  by  the  approximate  ratio  of  1  to  10  between 
reserves  and  deposits.  . . .Perhaps  not  more  than 
$100,000  out  of  all  the  checks  drawn  against  the 
$10,000,000  borrowed  would  be  deposited  at  the 
Hanover  National  Bank.  The  remainder  of the  manifold 
loans  supposedly  extended  on  the  basis  of the  imported 
gold.  . .would  represent  cash  that  the  bank  would  lose 
through  unfavorable  clearing  house  balances,  an amount 
that  would  be  scattered  widely  among  the  banks  of  the 
system.  It  is clear  that  an  individual  bank  attempting  to 
lend  greatly  in excess  of the  amount  of an addition  to  its 
reserves  would  do  so  at  its  peril  [14,  pp.  37-38]. 
Second,  he  explained  with  greater  rigor  and  ex- 
actness  than  his predecessors  how the  individual  bank 
contributes  to  systemwide  multiple  expansion  even 
though  it cannot  itself  multiply  deposits.  “How,”  he 
asked,  “can a given  amount  of cash  become  the  basis 
of manifold  loans  and  deposits  in a banking  system 
if the  acquisition  of that  amount  by an individual  bank 
has  little  or  no  multiplicative  importance?”  [14,  p. 
34].  His  answer  is  that  excess  cash  reserves  ob- 
tained  by  one  bank  will,  upon  being  lent  out,  pro- 
vide  another  bank  with  excess  cash  with  which  it 
expands  and  so on  until  all cash  is employed  in sup- 
porting  deposits  at  the  ratio  of  one  to  r. 
The  sudden  acquisition  of a substantial  amount  of reserve 
by  a representative  individual  bank.  . . tends  to cause  that 
bank  to become  out  of tune  with  the  banks  in the  system 
as a whole.  As  the  individual  bank  increases  its  loans  in 
order  to  re-establish  its  normal  reserve-deposits  ratio, 
reserve  is lost  to  other  banks  and  the  new  reserve,  split 
into  small fragments,  becomes  dispersed  among  the  banks 
of the  system.  Through  the  process  of dispersion  it comes 
to  constitute  the  basis  of a manifold  loan  expansion  (14, 
p.  40]. 
In  short, 
Manifold  loans  are  not  extended  by  an  individual  bank 
on  the  basis  of  a given  amount  of  reserve.  Instead,  as  a 
consequence  of lending,  the  reserve  of the  individual  bank 
overflows,  leaving  only  the  equivalent  of a fractional  part 
of the  additional  volume  of loans  extended,  the  overflow 
cash  finding  its  way  to  other  and  still  other  banks  until 
it becomes  the  “residualized,”  yet  shifting,  foundation  of 
manifold  loans  and  deposits  [14,  p.  73]. 
To  emphasize  the  point,  he  contrasted  the  way  the 
banking  system  and  the  individual  bank  reach  their 
desired  reserve-deposit  ratios-the  system  by  ex- 
panding  its deposit  denominator;  the  bank  by shrink- 
ing  its  reserve  numerator. 
Third,  he was the  first to publish  algebraic  formulas 
expressing  the  loan  and  deposit  expansion  potential 
of both  the  banking  system  and  the  individual  bank. 
Then  he  used  the  standard  mathematical  technique 
of  summation  of  a series  to  show  that  aggregation 
across  the  individual  banks  yields  the  systemwide 
formulas.  His  formulas  for  the  banking  system  are 
straightforward  and  need  only  be  summarized  here. 
According  to him,  a system  facing  a required  reserve 
ratio  r can,  upon  the  receipt  of  a new  cash  deposit 
C,  immediately  expand  its  loans  L  and  deposits  D 
where  the  latter  parenthesized  multiplier  is one  larger 
than  the  former  since  it  takes  account  of the  initial 
primary  deposit  as well  as deposits  created  by  loan. 
His  expansion  formulas  for  the  individual  bank, 
however,  require  some  explanation.  He  noted  that 
the  expansion  power  of the  individual  bank  depends 
not  only  on  its  reserve  ratio  r but  also  on  the  frac- 
tion k of its loans that  remain  with it as deposits.  This 
fraction,  he  argued,  depends  upon  such  things  as 
compensating  balance  requirements,  the  accumula- 
tion  of balances  in borrowers’  accounts  in anticipa- 
tion  of loan  repayment,  and  the  redeposit  of checks 
in  the  same  bank  upon  which  drawn.  Given  these 
factors,  it is an easy  matter  to trace  Phillips’s  deriva- 
tion  of  the  bank’s  loan  and  deposit  expansion 
formulas. 
Thus  for  an individual  bank  having  a reserve  ratio 
r and  an initial  cash  deposit  C,  let  k be  the  fraction 
of  loan-created  deposits  retained  by  the  bank,  and 
L  the  extra  loans  made.  Once  the  loans  are  granted 
and (1 -k)  of them  withdrawn,  final deposits  (original 
plus  the  retained  fraction  of those  created  by  loan) 
of C + kL  must,  because  deposited  funds  are  either 
held  in  reserve  or  lent  out,  equal  loans  L  plus  re- 
quired  reserves  r(C + kL)  obtained  by  applying  the 
reserve  ratio  to  deposits.  In short,  C  +  kL  =  L  + 
r(C  +  kL).  Solving  this  equilibrium  condition  for 
loans  yields  Phillips’s  loan  expansion  formula  L  = 
preceding  definition  of final  deposits,  results  in the 
where  the  bracketed  terms  are  the  loan  and  deposit 
multipliers. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK OF RICHMOND  9 Using  the  preceding  formulas,  Phillips  showed  that 
if cash  deposits  C  equal  $1,000,  and  r and  k equal 
10 and  20 percent,  respectively,  then  the  individual 
bank  can  expand  its  loans  L  and  deposits  D  by 
$1,097.25  and $1,219.51.  These  sums are somewhat 
larger  that  those  of the  hypothetical  atomistic  bank 
of the  textbooks,  whose  k-factor  of zero  reduces  its 
loan and deposit  multipliers  to (1 -r)  and  1.0, respec- 
tively.  On  the  other  hand,  the  loan  and deposit  sums 
of  Phillips’s  example  are  smaller  than  their  coun- 
terparts  in the  case of a single monopoly  bank,  whose 
k-factor  of  1.0  yields  loan  and  deposit  multipliers 
k-factor,  varying  as  it  does  between  one  and  zero, 
essentially  indicates  the  extent  to which  any one  bank 
can  act  as  a monopoly  bank,  expanding  loans  and 
deposits  as if it were  the  banking  system  as a whole 
(see  Timberlake  [18,  pp.  10-12]). 
Finally,  in  a demonstration  similar  to  Marshall’s, 
Phillips  showed  that  the  summation  of the  loan-  and 
deposit-creation  series  across  all  individual  banks 
yields  the  multiple  expansion  formulas  for the  system 
as  a  whole.  Phillips’s  definitive  exposition  essen- 
tially  established  the  theory  once  and  for  all in  the 
form  found  in  economics  textbooks  today. 
The  Theory  Since  Phillips 
Since  Phillips,  at least  three  innovations  have  en- 
hanced  the  theory  of  deposit  expansion.  First, 
economists  James  Harvey  Rogers  [15],  Procter 
Thomson  [17],  and  James  Angel1  and  Karel  Ficek 
[1]  incorporated  into  the  deposit  multiplier  the 
public’s  currency-to-deposit  ratio,  c,  to  account  for 
cash  drains  induced  by  deposit  expansion  itself. 
Using  the  resulting  augmented  multiplier  expression 
reserve  ratios  c and  r act  to limit  deposit  expansion, 
which  is therefore  smaller  than  it  otherwise  would 
be  if limited  by  the  reserve  ratio  alone.  Still  other 
writers  have  incorporated  time  deposit  and  excess 
reserve  ratios  into  the  multiplier  thus  further 
diminishing  its magnitude.  Second,  James  Meade  [9], 
Milton  Friedman  and Anna  Schwartz  [5, pp.  784-94] 
as well as Phillip  Cagan  (2, p.  12] have  extended  the 
idea  of  the  deposit  expansion  multiplier  into  the 
broader  concept  of the  money multiplier,  m,  relating 
the  total  money  stock  (currency  plus  demand  de- 
posits),  M,  to  the  so-called  high-powered  monetary 
base,  B,  consisting  of  bank  reserves  plus  currency 
held  by  the  public  according  to  the  expression 
M=mB.  Third,  Paul  Samuelson  [16,  p.  283]  has 
observed  that  the  small bank  “expands”  in symmetry 
with  the  system,  not  by  multiplying  deposits  on  a 
given  new  reserve  but  by  fractionalizing  its reserve 
on  a given  new  deposit. 
But  these  extensions,  important  as  they  are,  are 
merely  recent  refinements  made  to  the  fundamen- 
tal  core  of  ideas  laid  down  by  Pennington  and  his 
successors.  The  key  ideas  of  that  core-namely 
that  a fractional  reserve  banking  system  multiplies 
deposits,  that  the  mechanics  of multiplication  involve 
the  successive  lending  and  redeposit  of  excess 
reserves,  that  some  crucial  ratio  or  ratios  exist  to 
limit the  expansion,  and that  the  individual  bank  con- 
tributes  to  the  expansion  process  not  by  multiply- 
ing its own  deposits  but  by  creating  them  for  others 
when  it makes  loans  and  loses  reserves  through  the 
clearinghouse-were  already  enunciated  more  than 
a  century  ago.  Even  today,  one  finds  these  ideas 
indispensable  to  a  full  understanding  of  how  the 
supply  of  bank  money  expands  and  contracts. 
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